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KILL THE SNITCH: HOW HENRIQUEZ-RIVAS AFFECTS 
ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY FOR PEOPLE WHO REPORT 
SERIOUS GANG CRIMES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
James Carr 




Abstract: In 2015, El Salvador became the murder capital of the world. Like its Central 
American neighbors, El Salvador has experienced a significant increase in gang violence 
during the past decade, as evidenced by its 2015 homicide statistics showing over 6,600 
registered homicides in the country despite a population of only 6.3 million people. Rising 
crime rates and widespread gang influence are forcing many affected Central Americans to 
seek asylum in the United States. 
Individuals may qualify for asylum if they have a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group. Some of the most recent immigration case law explores the definition of membership 
in a particular social group. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Henriquez-Rivas created 
a new particular social group by extending asylum eligibility to individuals who witness and 
testify to serious crimes committed by gangs. Henriquez-Rivas eliminates the requirement for 
a particular social group to be visible to the naked eye. According to the Ninth Circuit, if a 
proposed particular social group is understood by society to constitute a group, then that 
group is “socially distinct” and therefore cognizable. 
This Comment argues that the particular social group created by Henriquez-Rivas should 
be expanded to include people who report serious gang crimes to law enforcement without 
the need to testify in court. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, twelve-year-old Rocio Brenda Henriquez-Rivas’ father was 
brutally assaulted and murdered in El Salvador by four M-18 gang 
members.
2
 Henriquez-Rivas observed the men assault her father and 
heard the gunshots that killed him as she fled the scene.
3
 She identified 
two of the suspects from a lineup and testified against them in court.
4
 
                                                     
1. Jared Goyette, Óscar Martínez on Why El Salvador Is a ‘Good Place to Kill,’, PUB. RADIO 
INT’L (Apr. 20, 2016, 12:15 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-04-20/scar-mart-nez-why-el-
salvador-good-place-kill [https://perma.cc/3RYA-5U4P] (containing comments made by 
investigative journalist Óscar Martínez). 
2. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 1086. 
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Both men were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of seven years 
and twenty-five to thirty years, respectively.
5
 When Henriquez-Rivas 
returned to her father’s home to collect some paperwork, an individual 
warned her that gang members recently visited her house and claimed 
responsibility for killing her father.
6
 A few years later, an unknown man 
visited Henriquez-Rivas’ school and asked if anyone knew “Rocio 
Henriquez.”
7
 Henriquez-Rivas feared the gang intended to harm her 
because she testified in court and because the gang was ordered to pay 
restitution to Henriquez-Rivas’ family.
8
 In 2005, she fled to the United 
States and applied for asylum.
9
 
Now assume that shortly after Henriquez-Rivas filed her asylum 
application, another individual from El Salvador, Jaime,
10
 also applied 
for asylum. Imagine the facts in Jaime’s case are strikingly similar to 
those of Henriquez-Rivas. Jaime witnessed his father’s assault at the 
hands of M-18 gang members and escaped before anyone could harm 
him. As Jaime fled the scene, he heard the gunshots that killed his father. 
Jaime reported the crime to the local police and provided them with 
physical descriptions of each of the gang members involved in the 
assault and murder. However, unlike Henriquez-Rivas, Jaime refused to 
testify in court against the gang members because he feared the gang 
would exact revenge on him for his testimony. Given the level of 
corruption within the police department, Jaime also suspected law 
enforcement had already betrayed his trust by identifying him to the M-
18. One week before trial, Jaime received a series of anonymous phone 
calls threatening his life. He promptly left El Salvador and sought 
asylum in the United States. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) establishes the 
framework for determining whether refugees such as Henriquez-Rivas 
and Jaime should be granted asylum and a permanent home in the 
United States.
11
 According to the INA’s definition, a “refugee” is 






10. Jaime’s hypothetical scenario is a reality for many Central American immigrants fleeing gang 
violence. See Part III.A for examples of recent police corruption and gang influence in El Salvador. 
11. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING, ASYLUM 
ELIGIBILITY PART III: NEXUS AND THE FIVE PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS 5 (2009), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asyl
um/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Nexus-the-Five-Protected-Characteristics-31aug10.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/EYQ5-KDV6] [hereinafter U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III]. 
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someone who is (1) unable or unwilling to return to his or her home 
country (2) because of either past persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution (3) on account of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
12
 Of these five 




The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first confronted this 
ambiguity with its oft-cited PSG analysis in In re Acosta.
14
 After nearly 
thirty years of attempts to refine its definition, certain elements of PSGs 
remain a divisive issue among the circuit courts.
15
 While some circuits 
accept the BIA’s PSG analysis, others have either completely abandoned 
it or modified the analysis to maintain consistency with the BIA’s 
decisions made after In re Acosta.
16
 
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit decided Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder
17
 and 
recognized Henriquez-Rivas’ membership in a PSG while rejecting the 
BIA’s interpretation of PSG requirements.
18
 In overruling the BIA, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that Henriquez-Rivas had a well-founded fear 
                                                     
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘refugee’ means . . . any person who is outside 
any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .”). 
13. Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 
392, 396 (1st Cir. 2004); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
14. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). The BIA’s decision in In re Acosta held that the common 
characteristic that defines a PSG “must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, 
or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.” Id. at 233.  
15. The circuits are divided on the “social visibility” requirement of the particular social group 
definition set forth by the BIA in In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–60 (B.I.A. 2006) and later 
clarified by the BIA in In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 586–89 (B.I.A. 2008). The Third and 
Seventh Circuits expressly reject social visibility. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 663 
F.3d 582, 607 (3d Cir. 2011); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009). The 
Fourth Circuit has declined to even address social visibility. See Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 
910 (4th Cir. 2014). The First (Rojas-Perez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2012)), Second (Ucelo-
Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)), Fifth (Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 
520 (5th Cir. 2012)), Sixth (Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 991, 994 (6th Cir. 2009)), Eighth 
(Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2008)), Ninth (Rojas v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 
1123 (9th Cir. 2015)), Tenth (Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2015)), and 
Eleventh (Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006)) Circuits all 
accept variations of the BIA’s “social visibility” requirement from In re C-A-. 
16. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2013); Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 605–08; Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).  
17. 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). 
18. Id. at 1083. 
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of persecution because of her membership in a newly recognized PSG: 
“witnesses who testify against gang members.”
19
 The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision confirmed that a PSG exists in the absence of “on-sight” 
visibility if the member’s identity has come to the attention of gang 
members.
20
 Although the decision did not address asylum eligibility for 
people in Jaime’s position—Salvadoran witnesses who report serious 
gang crimes to law enforcement—the court’s PSG analysis supports 
expanding eligibility to witnesses who do not testify.
21
 
This Comment addresses the lack of relief available to individuals 
like Jaime. Part I provides a brief history of asylum law and analyzes the 
evolution of PSGs. Part II identifies the effects of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Henriquez-Rivas decision on PSGs and how different circuits have either 
accepted or rejected that view. Part III explores the possibility of 
expanding the PSG created under Henriquez-Rivas to include applicants 
who report gang crimes without testifying in court, such as Jaime. This 
Comment argues that individuals from certain countries who report 
serious gang crimes to law enforcement should be eligible for asylum 




I. EVOLUTION OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
CRITERIA 
As violence and murder rates steadily rise throughout the Northern 







—there has been a marked increase in the number of people 
fleeing the area and seeking asylum abroad.
26
 The United States 
                                                     
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1088 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960). 
21. See infra note 192; see id. at 1091–94 for a discussion of “social distinction” and how it 
applies to the PSG analysis. 
22. Part III focuses almost exclusively on El Salvador and the impact of gangs on Salvadoran 
society. However, this Comment does not limit the scope of its argument to El Salvador. The same 
arguments, as well as relevant country conditions evidence, may be applied to countries with similar 
levels of gang influence, such as Guatemala and Honduras. 
23. El Salvador experienced 103 homicides per 100,000 people in 2015. David Gagne, InSight 
Crime’s 2015 Latin America Homicide Round-up, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 14, 2016), 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-
caribbean [https://perma.cc/778D-Z33U]. 
24. Id. (Guatemala experienced 29.5 homicides per 100,000 people in 2015). 
25. Id. (Honduras experienced 56.7 homicides per 100,000 people in 2015).  
26. Children on the Run, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/children-on-the-run.html [https://perma.cc/L27E-UK96]. 
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continues to process the majority of the asylum claims coming out of the 
region, but, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), neighboring Central American countries 
experienced more than a 1000% increase in the number of Northern 
Triangle asylum applications between 2008 and 2014.
27
 These numbers 
reflect the fear and insecurity that motivates migration from the Northern 
Triangle.
28
 For those individuals seeking refuge in the United States, 
satisfying the asylum requirements posed by the American legal system 
is daunting.
29
 It is not enough for an asylum applicant to demonstrate a 
well-founded fear of persecution, such as Jaime’s fear of M-18 gang 
persecution.
30
 The applicant must also prove either past harm or future 
harm as a result of one of the five protected grounds—race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a PSG.
31
 
A. The United States Recognizes Asylum Eligibility for People Who 
Have Suffered Severe Past Persecution or Fear Future Persecution 
on Account of a Protected Interest 
In 1968, the United States committed itself to the protection of 
refugees by ratifying the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (the “1967 Protocol”), which expanded on the 1951 
United Nations Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(the “1951 Convention”).
32
 Under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, 
“[n]o [c]ontracting [s]tate shall expel or return . . . a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to . . . where his life or freedom would be threatened 
                                                     
27. Id. (“UNHCR has documented a 1,185% increase in the number of [Northern Triangle] 
asylum applications [submitted to] Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Belize, combined, 
from 2008 to 2014.”) 
28. See Five Facts About Migration from Central America’s Northern Triangle, WASH. OFFICE 
ON LATIN AM. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.wola.org/analysis/five-facts-about-migration-from-
central-americas-northern-triangle/ [https://perma.cc/4GTY-NXUF].  
29. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW 
REPORT, REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2014 1 (2016) (only 23,533 individuals were granted asylum in 
2014). 
30. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING, ASYLUM 
ELIGIBILITY PART I: DEFINITION OF REFUGEE; DEFINITION OF PERSECUTION; ELIGIBILITY BASED 
ON PAST PERSECUTION 8 (2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/ 
Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Definition-Refugee-Persecution 
-Eligibiity-31aug10.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE9K-2X8R] [hereinafter U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS.]. 
31. Id. 
32. Diane Uchimiya, Falling Through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties in Current Asylum 
Jurisprudence, 23 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 109, 131 n.166 (2013). The United States is bound by 
both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Id. at n.177. 
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on account of his race, religion, nationality . . . or political opinion.”
33
 
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol serve as legally binding 
treaties, obligating signatories to protect refugees forced to flee their 
countries due to persecution.
34
 
The United States derived its original definition of “refugee”
35
 from 
the 1951 Convention, which limited refugee status to individuals with a 
fear of future persecution.
36
 That definition remained largely unchanged 
until 1980, when Congress passed an amendment to the INA, known as 
the Refugee Act of 1980 (“Refugee Act”).
37
 The Refugee Act served as a 
response to the needs of people suffering persecution in their 
homelands.
38
 It expanded the 1951 Convention’s definition to include 
individuals who had a well-founded fear of future persecution and 
individuals who had suffered past persecution.
39
 Under the current INA 
regulation, asylum applicants must now establish that they are: 
unable or unwilling to return to, and [are] unable or unwilling to 
avail [themselves] of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.
40
 
                                                     
33. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, U.N. Refugee Agency, Exec. Comm. of the High 
Comm’r’s Programme, Sub-Comm. of the Whole on Int’l Protection, Note on Non-Refoulement 
(Submitted by the High Commissioner), at ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977) [hereinafter 
UNHCR] (finding non-refoulement widely accepted as a customary norm of international law and 
noting that “[t]he most essential component of refugee status and of asylum is protection against 
return to a country where a person has reason to fear persecution.”). Id. ¶ 18. 
34. Uchimiya, supra note 32, at 132. 
35. See UNHCR, supra note 33, at art. 1. A refugee is any person who,  
owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership [in] a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence . . . is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
Id. 
36. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 30, at 6–7. 
37. See Maurice A. Roberts, The U.S. and Refugees: The Refugee Act of 1980, 12 ISSUE: A 
JOURNAL OF OPINION, 4–6 (1982). The Refugee Act of 1980 served as the first comprehensive 
amendment to the country’s general immigration laws. Id. at 4. For a more detailed explanation of 
the INA, see Tom Gjelten, The Immigration Act That Inadvertently Changed America, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/immigration-act-
1965/408409/ [https://perma.cc/ZH3N-T76H]. 
38. Uchimiya, supra note 32, at 133. 
39. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 30, at 7 (“In contrast, the UN 
definition focuses on well-founded fear.”). 
40. Id. at 6.  
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An asylum officer or immigration judge must first determine whether 
the harm the applicant fears rises to the level of persecution before 
moving to an analysis of the protected interest.
41
 Persecution is 
characterized as “the infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a way 
regarded as offensive.”
42
 The BIA has found that both serious physical 
harm and non-physical harm can amount to persecution.
43
 Deprivation of 
food, liberty, housing, and employment are just a few examples of non-
physical harm recognized by the BIA.
44
 Threats of serious harm, as 
experienced by both Henriquez-Rivas and Jaime, may constitute 
persecution when they are combined with confrontations or other 
mistreatment.
45
 Once it is determined that an applicant’s harm is 
sufficiently serious, the adjudicator must next establish whether the 
applicant is a refugee based on either past persecution or a well-founded 
fear of future persecution.
46
 An applicant that alleges past persecution 
has the burden of establishing that “the persecution was on account of 
one or more protected grounds . . . and the persecution was committed 
by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or 
unwilling to control.”
47
 Some courts also look to the motivation of the 
persecutor in determining whether the applicant suffered persecution.
48
 




Courts require that applicants seeking asylum based on a well-
founded fear of future persecution satisfy both an objective element and 
                                                     
41. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 30, at 15 (“The degree of harm must be 
addressed before an asylum officer may find that the harm that the applicant suffered or fears can be 
considered ‘persecution.’”). 
42. Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 
955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). 
43. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 30, at 16. 
44. See In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 171 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 
457 (B.I.A. 1983) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1452 at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4700, 4702 (“The harm or suffering need not be physical, but may take other forms, such as the 
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, 
employment or other essentials of life.”)). 
45. Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004). 
46. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 30.  
47. Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). 
48. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 30, at 15. 
49. See Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743, 754 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven in situations of widespread 
civil strife, ‘it is irrelevant whether one person, twenty persons, or a thousand persons were targeted 
or placed at risk,’ so long as there is a nexus to a protected ground.”); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 
F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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 The subjective element is met only if an 
applicant’s fear of persecution is genuine.
51
 To meet the subjective 
element, applicants cannot have a primary motivation for seeking refuge 
in the United States other than a genuine fear of persecution.
52
 For 
example, “disagreement with the conditions in another country or a 
desire to experience greater economic advantage or personal freedom 
in . . . the United States” does not meet the subjective element of a well-
founded fear of future persecution.
53
 
The objective element is satisfied if there exists “a reasonable 
possibility of suffering [the feared] persecution.”
54
 The Supreme Court 
clarified that the objective requirement of a “well-founded fear” does not 
require a high statistical probability of persecution.
55
 “[E]ven a ten 
percent chance of persecution may establish a well-founded fear.”
56
 
Determining the existence of a well-founded fear is to be “based on facts 
that would lead a reasonable person in similar circumstances to fear 
persecution.”
57
 The objective element may also be satisfied if the 
applicant is able to prove past persecution, thus “giving rise to a 




This Comment addresses expanding the PSG created by Henriquez-
Rivas to include applicants with a well-founded fear of future 
persecution rather than applicants who have already suffered severe past 
persecution. As such, it is important to understand the necessary criteria 
                                                     
50. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING, ASYLUM 
ELIGIBILITY PART II: WELL-FOUNDED FEAR (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/ 
default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20
Plans/Well-Founded-Fear-31aug10.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GA3-WQDA] [hereinafter U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART II].  
51. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985). 
52. Id. at 221. 
53. Id. 
54. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(B) (2016). 
55. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). 
56. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 
440 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424–25 (1984)) (“[S]o long as an objective situation is 
established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in 
persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.”). 
57. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART II, supra note 50, at 5; Lolong v. Gonzales, 
484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (applicant needs evidence that is credible, direct, and 
specific). 
58. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Adebe v. 
Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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to establish that a well-founded fear exists for applicants who have not 
suffered severe past persecution. 
B. A Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution Requires Possession, 
Awareness, Capability, and Inclination 
Four basic criteria are required to establish a well-founded fear of 
future persecution: possession, awareness, capability, and inclination.
59
 
Possession and awareness are the most easily recognizable of the four 
criteria and warrant little attention. The possession requirement is met if 
the applicant is targeted for possessing a trait the persecutor “seeks to 
overcome.”
60
 Awareness is satisfied if the applicant can prove that “there 
is a reasonable possibility that the persecutor could become aware that 
the applicant possesses the characteristic [at issue].”
61
 If the claim is 
based on a characteristic the applicant does not actually possess, but that 
the persecutor believes the applicant possesses, the applicant can still 
satisfy the possession requirement.
62
 To satisfy this requirement, the 
adjudicator must find it is reasonable that the persecutor believes the 
applicant possesses the characteristic.
63
 For instance, if a gang 
erroneously believes that a witness reported a crime to law enforcement, 
that witness will satisfy both the possession and awareness requirements 
if an adjudicator determines it is reasonable for the gang to believe the 
witness reported the crime. Revisiting Jaime’s situation, he needs to first 
establish that the M-18 is aware he possesses a characteristic before he 
establishes the capability and inclination of the M-18 to persecute him 
for possessing that characteristic. 
Jaime meets the possession requirement because he witnessed and 
reported the serious gang crime to law enforcement. For Jaime to meet 
the awareness requirement, he must establish that the M-18 is aware that 
he witnessed a crime and reported it to law enforcement. The M-18 
                                                     
59. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 
(B.I.A. 1985). 
60. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 226 (holding that the applicant must “possess a belief or 
characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome . . . by means of punishment of some sort.”). 
However, the persecutor does not need to possess a malignant intent. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 
F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
61. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART II, supra note 50, at 7. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. This is known as an “imputed characteristic”; see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 80 (“Persecution inflicted upon an individual because the 
persecutor attributes to the individual one of the protected characteristics constitutes persecution on 
account of that characteristic.”). 
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called Jaime and threatened him after he reported the crime, which 
means that the M-18 is aware he possesses the trait. If the facts of the 
case were to change, and Jaime was not threatened at any point after his 
report to police, it would still be possible for Jaime to establish that the 
M-18 was aware, or could become aware, of his possession of the trait. 
To do this, a court might look to the level of corruption that exists within 
El Salvador’s police and, in particular, whether certain departments have 
been corrupted by gangs.
64
 
The third factor in determining whether a well-founded fear exists is 
the assessment of the persecutor’s capability to actually persecute the 
applicant. To satisfy capability, applicants may rely on evidence of 
government entities that participate in the persecution, directly or 
indirectly.
65
 Specifically, is the government willing to control the 
persecutor and to what extent is the persecutor able to “enforce its will 
throughout the country[?]”
66
 Evidence of country conditions establishing 
that gang members are able to harm individuals similarly situated to 
Jaime would also satisfy the capability requirement.
67
 Internal relocation 
poses a potential bar to an asylum claim.
68
 For example, if it is 
reasonable for an applicant to relocate to another part of the country and 
avoid future persecution, “adjudicators should consider . . . whether the 




The BIA uses a two-step inquiry to determine the applicant’s ability 
to relocate and the reasonableness of that relocation.
70
 First, the 
relocation must be to a part of the country where the applicant has no 
well-founded fear of continued persecution.
71
 Second, an Immigration 
Judge is tasked with determining “whether the applicant would face 
other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing 
civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial 
                                                     
64. See Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2000) (for usefulness of country 
conditions). Part III of this Comment reveals more information related to Salvadoran police 
corruption by the M-18 and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). 
65. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART II, supra note 50, at 7. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 7. One factor to consider in evaluating capability is “the extent to which the persecutor 
has the ability to enforce its will throughout the country.” In Jaime’s case, the M-18 is more than 
capable of tracking Jaime’s whereabouts anywhere within El Salvador. See infra note 79 and 
accompanying text. 
68. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3) (2016). 
69. Id. 
70. In re M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 32 (B.I.A. 2012). 
71. Id. at 33. 
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infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural 
constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties.”
72
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the burden of meeting 
the abovementioned criteria and demonstrating that relocation is safe 
and accessible to the applicant.
73
 
Finally, applicants must also establish the persecutor’s inclination to 
persecute him or her.
74
 The applicant can use prior threats or harm by the 
persecutor as well as the persecutor’s treatment of similarly-situated 
individuals to establish the existence of inclination.
75
 However, the 
applicant is not required to provide evidence that he or she would be 
singled out individually for persecution if: 
(A) The applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in 
his or her country  . . . of persecution of a group of persons 
similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion; and 
(B) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and 
identification with, such group of persons such that his or her 
fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.
76
 
Inclination is also established by relying on relevant country 
conditions and human rights reports.
77
 For example, if Country X is 
notorious for practicing female genital mutilation (FGM) on the vast 
majority of indigenous women, it logically follows that indigenous 
women from Country X will have a well-founded fear of future FGM. 
According to the Eighth Circuit, there does not need to be “a showing of 
persecution of all members of a group” to establish that a pattern or 
practice of behavior exists.
78
 The mere fact that the majority of 
indigenous women from Country X suffer FGM is enough to meet the 
requirement for a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
                                                     
72. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (2016). 
73. See M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 34. 
74. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART II, supra note 50, at 7. 
75. Id.; Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 2004); Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 
33 (2d Cir. 1994). 
76. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2016). 
77. See Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (“When, as here, a petitioner 
has not established past persecution, there is no presumption to overcome . . . [and] the IJ and the 
BIA are entitled to rely on all relevant evidence in the record, including a State Department 
report . . . .”). 
78. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART II, supra note 50, at 7; Makonnen v. INS, 44 
F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1995); Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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In Jaime’s case, M-18 members are both capable and inclined to harm 
Jaime for identifying them to police. Jaime established “inclination” 
when the gang started threatening his life and presumably began looking 
for him after he made his report to law enforcement. Gangs are well 
connected throughout El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and they 
are often able to get assistance from law enforcement to uncover the 
whereabouts of witnesses.
79
 The two most notorious gangs in El 
Salvador, the MS-13 and the M-18, consist of networks of hundreds of 
neighborhood gang cells.
80
 As a result, these vast gang networks prevent 




Given that many of the Central American gangs . . . have 
country- or even region-wide reach and organization, there may 
generally be no realistic internal flight alternative . . . attempts 
[at relocation] have often been unsuccessful as gangs can locate 
the individual in urban as well as rural areas, appearing at the 




Individuals who testify against gang members are especially 
vulnerable to gang persecution.
83
 Witnesses to Central American gang 
crimes are frequently afraid to testify in court due to corruption within 
the judicial system and concerns about retaliation.
84
 Prosecutors and 
judges are “equally afraid to pursue cases against high-profile 
criminals.”
85
 Out of 28,324 cases that went to trial in El Salvador from 
                                                     
79. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS 
RELATING TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS, ¶¶ 37–38, 41 (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4bb21fa02.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
80. Uchimiya, supra note 32, at 162. 
81. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 79, ¶¶ 37–38, 41.  
82. Id. ¶¶ 53–54. 
83. Lisa Frydman & Neha Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S. Treatment of 




84. U.S. SENATE CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, RESPONDING TO VIOLENCE IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA 7 (Sept. 2011), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/ 
serve?File_id=a67575d5-66dd-4e36-a4ae-6a4f70de500a&SK=689B2D014C1464F4CFD6561AA5 
FEDC4F [https://perma.cc/FH8W-5Y77]; see also CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, U.S. CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 5 (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB3Y-DQ32]. The MS-13 has reportedly been hired by 
Mexican drug cartels to carry out revenge killings. Id. 
85. See U.S. SENATE CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 84, at 40. 
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January to September 2014, only 3,898 resulted in convictions.
86
 Exactly 
11,146 of these cases were dismissed due to lack of evidence or 
prosecutor inactivity.
87
 These low conviction rates indicate that the 
courts are not always able to offer adequate protection to people in 
Jaime’s situation. 
Asylum applicants who effectively meet the possession, awareness, 
capability, and inclination requirements are generally deemed to have 
established a well-founded fear of future persecution.
88
 For those 
applicants who establish a well-founded fear of persecution, such as 
Jaime, the next step in the asylum process is to demonstrate the link 
between the well-founded fear and one of the five protected interests. 
C. In re C-A- Altered the Post-Acosta Landscape by Introducing 
More Confusion to the Particular Social Group Analysis 
The five protected interests are referred to as the “statutorily protected 
grounds.”
89
 For a refugee to be eligible for asylum, the persecutor’s 
motivation must be on account of the applicant’s possession of at least 
one of the five statutorily protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership in a PSG.
90
 The applicant is then 
required to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the persecutor 
was or would be motivated to persecute the applicant because of the 
protected ground.
91
 Persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or 
political opinion goes beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead, this 
Comment addresses the confusion and disagreement among the courts 
when it comes to defining persecution of a PSG.
92
 
Persecution because of membership in a PSG was included in the 
INA’s definition of “refugee” in order to maintain consistency with the 
1967 Protocol and the U.N. Convention.
93
 However, Congress failed to 
define the term “particular social group” in the INA.
94
 
                                                     
86. El Salvador: Crime and State Efforts to Combat Crime; State Protection for Victims and 
Witnesses (2012–August 2015) ¶ 3.1, IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN. (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/55ffa7354.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
87. Id. 
88. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART II, supra note 50, at 5–7. 
89. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 5. 
90. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–84 (1992). 
91. Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1486–87 (9th Cir. 1997). 
92. Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the phrase 
“particular social group” is ambiguous). 
93. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985).  
94. Id. 
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It has been suggested that the notion of “social group” was 
considered to be of broader application than the combined 
notions of racial, ethnic, and religious groups and that in order to 
stop a possible gap in the coverage of the U.N. Convention, this 
ground was added to the definition of a refugee . . . . The 
UNHCR has suggested that a “particular social group” connotes 
persons of similar background, habits, or social status and that a 
claim to fear persecution on this ground may frequently overlap 




In In re Acosta, the BIA first interpreted “particular social group” to 
require an “immutable characteristic.”
96
 In Acosta, a taxi driver from El 
Salvador, Acosta, argued that he was a member of a PSG consisting of 
other members of the same taxi cooperative to which he belonged.
97
 
Acosta claimed he was being persecuted by “anti-government guerillas 
who targeted small businesses in the transportation industry.”
98
 The BIA 
ultimately rejected this argument because the identifying characteristic 
of the proposed PSG was not immutable—that is, drivers were free to 
change jobs.
99
 According to the BIA, the common characteristic that 
defines a group “must be one that members of the group either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to 
their individual identities or consciences.”
100
 For twenty years, the 
Acosta immutability standard was the only guidance the BIA offered for 
determining the existence of a PSG. 
In 2006, the BIA’s holding in In re C-A-
101
 refined the Acosta 
standard by introducing “social visibility” and “particularity” as 
additional factors to the PSG analysis.
102
 With its decision in In re C-A-, 
the BIA became more consistent with the United Nations guidelines, 
which confirmed the importance of “visibility” in identifying the 
existence of PSGs.
103
 The BIA defined “social visibility” as “the extent 
                                                     
95. Id. at 232–33. 
96. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013). 
97. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232. 
98. Id. at 216. 
99. Id. at 233–34. 
100. Id. at 233. 
101. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006). 
102. Id. at 957, 959–60. 
103. Id. at 960. The “social visibility” requirement from In re C-A- was issued three years after 
the Justice Department asked five liberal judges on the Board of Immigration Appeals to step down. 
Critics called the action a “purge” of all pro-immigration judges. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & 
Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to Leave; Critics Call It a ‘Purge’, L.A. TIMES 
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to which members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in 
question as members of a social group.”
104
 To satisfy the “particularity” 
requirement, the social group must be clearly and easily defined.
105
 
In re C-A- concerned a confidential informant that provided police 
with information on the notorious Cali Cartel
106
 over a four-year 
period.
107
 In May 1995, the applicant was confronted and beaten by three 
armed men.
108
 The noise of the altercation brought neighbors out of their 
homes, and the attackers fled.
109
 The attackers warned the applicant that 
life “would get worse for him and his family” for informing on the 
cartel.
110
 The applicant went into hiding and moved to the United States 
in 1996.
111
 The BIA failed to recognize the PSG at issue in In re C-A- 
because confidential informants remain out of public view.
112
 
“[V]isibility is limited to those informants who are discovered because 
they appear as witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel 
members.”
113
 The confidential informant at issue in In re C-A- neither 
appeared as a witness nor came to the attention of cartel members.
114
 
In 2008, the BIA clarified that the “social visibility” and 
“particularity” factors introduced in In re C-A- were, in fact, 
requirements for all PSGs.
115
 With its decision in In re S-E-G-,
116
 the 
                                                     
(Mar. 12, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/nation/na-immig12 [https://perma.cc/ 
T7XB-RRMX]. 
104. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957. 
105. Id. (rejecting “noncriminal informants” as a particular social group because its membership 
is “too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity.”).  
106. The Cali Cartel was an association of five independent Colombian drug trafficking 
organizations that rose to prominence during the 1980s and 90s after the collapse of the Medellin 
Cartel. The cartel managed criminal enterprises throughout Latin America, Europe, and the United 
States. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALI CARTEL: THE NEW KINGS OF COCAINE (Nov. 1994), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/152436NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL9A-CHT5]. 




111. Id. at 953. 
112. Id. at 960–61. 
113. Id. at 960. 
114. Id. at 953, 960–61.  
115. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582–84 (B.I.A. 2008). The BIA’s decisions in In re S-E-
G- and In re C-A- continued the court’s trend of requiring more for particular social groups to gain 
recognition. Some critics maintain that this departure from Acosta can be directly attributed to the 
BIA “purge” of 2003, which resulted in a more conservative, less friendly immigration court. See 
Alonso-Zaldivar & Peterson, supra note 103. 
116. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008). 
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BIA “unequivocally elevated social visibility and particularity to the 
status of binding requirements.”
117
 “Particularity” was no longer vaguely 
defined, as it was after In re C-A-. 
The essence of the “particularity” requirement, therefore, is 
whether the proposed group can accurately be described in a 
manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, 
in the society in question, as a discrete class of 
persons. . . . [T]he key question is whether the proposed 
description is sufficiently “particular” . . . .
118
 
The BIA also reaffirmed its interpretation of “social visibility” by 
once again discussing the United Nations guidelines and emphasizing 




Most circuits have accepted the BIA’s “social visibility” and 
“particularity” requirements from In re C-A- and In re S-E-G-.
120
 
However, both the Third and Seventh Circuits reject the application of 
“social visibility” to PSGs.
121
 The Third Circuit maintains that “social 
visibility” is inconsistent with prior BIA decisions that relied solely on 
the Acosta immutability standard.
122
 Moreover, many PSGs recognized 
before In re C-A- would fail the BIA’s social visibility requirement.
123
 
The Seventh Circuit holds that “[social visibility] makes no sense” and 
rejects its use for the same reasons the Third Circuit refuses to adopt the 
test.
124
 The Third and Seventh Circuits reason that “social visibility” 
adds more confusion to the PSG analysis and that the BIA’s inconsistent 
                                                     
117. See Frydman & Desai, supra note 83, at 2. 
118. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584. 
119. Id. at 586 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956). 
120. See supra note 15. 
121. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., Particular Social Group Practice Advisory: Applying for 
Asylum After Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- 12 (Jan. 2016), http://immigrantjustice. 
org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/PSG%20Practice%20Advisory%20and%20Appendices-Final-
1.22.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N94-2PKH]. 
122. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011), remanded to the 
Immigration Judge sub nom. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[W]e are hard-
pressed to understand how the ‘social visibility’ requirement was satisfied in prior cases using the 
Acosta standard.”). 
123. Id. “[T]he BIA’s ‘social visibility’ requirement would pose an unsurmountable obstacle to 
refugee status” for established PSGs such as “women who are opposed to female genital mutilation 
([In re] Kasinga[, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996)]), homosexuals registered in Cuba ([In re] 
Toboso-Alfonso[, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990)]), and former members of El Salvador’s 
national police ([In re] Fuentes[, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988)]).” 
124. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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 Still, despite the debate 
surrounding “social visibility,” the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits accept at least some variation of the 
BIA’s “social visibility” requirement.
126
 
D. The BIA Uses a Three-Prong Test for Evaluating Particular Social 
Groups 
The “immutability,” “social visibility,” and “particularity” 
requirements derived from the BIA’s decisions in In re Acosta, In re C-
A-, and In re S-E-G- make up the three-prong test the BIA established 
for evaluating proposed PSGs.
127
 Under that test, “the group must 
comprise individuals who share a common, immutable [or fundamental] 
characteristic—such as sex, color, kinship ties, or past experience.”
128
 




PSGs are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
130
 Adjudicators are 
expected to examine the shared characteristic that defines the group to 
determine whether a group is considered socially visible.
131
 PSGs are 
“united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by 
an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or 
consciences of its members that members either cannot or should not be 
required to change it.”
132
 A group must meet all the three prongs of the 
                                                     
125. Id. at 615–17; Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604. 
126. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013); Rojas-Perez v. Holder, 
699 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2012); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 681 (8th Cir. 2012); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 
652–53 (10th Cir. 2012); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 991, 994 (6th Cir. 2009); Ucelo-
Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 
1197 (11th Cir. 2006). 
127. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 21 (discussing the 
impact of In re Acosta and In re C-A-); NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., supra note 121, at 1–2 
(discussing the impact of In re S-E-G- on the BIA’s PSG requirements). 
128. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 22 (citing In re 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985)). 
129. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960; Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1198. 
130. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34; see also Morgan v. Holder, 634 F.3d 53, 61 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (“Asylum cases, virtually by definition, call for individualized determinations.”). 
131. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 955. 
132. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Hernandez-Montiel 
v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 
409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
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The BIA hoped the immutability requirement would “preserve the 
concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are either unable by 
their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to 
avoid persecution.”
134
 Asylum adjudicators are often tasked with 
evaluating subjective and objective elements of an applicant’s 
fundamental characteristic under the immutability prong.
135
 The 
subjective element considers how the applicant experiences the 
fundamental characteristic as part of his or her identity or conscience.
136
 
The objective requirement considers basic human rights norms.
137
 For 
example, applicants fleeing female genital mutilation have a stronger 
claim from an objective perspective than a member of a terrorist 
organization escaping persecution from the same terrorists he once 
supported because there is no basic human right to pursue an association 
with terrorist organizations.
138
 Voluntary assumption of extraordinary 
risk of serious harm in taking on a trait that defines a group may also be 
evidence of immutability.
139
 However, an applicant who undertakes risks 




If an asylum applicant establishes that membership in a PSG is 
immutable, the applicant must also establish that the group is 
recognizable or distinct within the society in question.
141
 The BIA 
defined “social visibility” in a manner that it hoped would ensure that 
PSGs would not become a “‘catchall’ applicable to all persons fearing 
persecution.”
142
 Distinctive traits shared by group members are a good 
indication of social distinction, but the group is not required to self-
identify to be considered socially distinct.
143
 In certain instances, some 
group members may conceal their identity to avoid persecution. Judge 
                                                     
133. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 23. 
134. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234. 
135. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366, 373 (B.I.A. 1996). 
136. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 23. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 24–25. 
139. Id. at 25. 
140. Id. 
141. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006). 
142. Id. at 960. 
143. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 27. 
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Posner in Gatimi v. Holder
144
 explained: if people are trying to kill, 
torture, or persecute you, “you will take pains to avoid being socially 
visible.”
145
 Judge Posner’s remarks help explain the BIA’s determination 
that social distinction must be “considered in the context of the country 
of concern and the persecution feared.”
146
 
In In re A-M-E & J-G-U-,
147
 the BIA reviewed Guatemalan country 
conditions to better understand the context of the proposed PSG.
148
 The 
BIA held that “affluent Guatemalans” were not socially visible within 
Guatemalan society.
149
 After a careful review of country conditions, the 
court was unable to see a difference in danger between “affluent 
Guatemalans” and society in general.
150
 In other words, affluent 
Guatemalans were no more visible to society than non-affluent 
Guatemalans. Similarly, in Donchev v. Mukasey,
151
 the Ninth Circuit did 
not recognize the Roma people as a socially visible group because 
country conditions did not indicate that the Bulgarian government or 




PSGs must also meet a third requirement: “particularity.”
153
 
“Particularity” means that society can readily recognize who is a 
member of the group and who is not a member of the group.
154
 In In re 
S-E-G-, the BIA held the following group did not meet the particularity 
requirement because it was too amorphous: a group composed of boys 
who lacked stable families and adult protection from the MS-13 gang, 
who were from middle- and low-income families living in territories 
controlled by the MS-13, and who refused gang recruitment.
155
 The 
definition of the group needs to provide a point of reference for 
“determining who the members of the group are so that membership 
                                                     
144. 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009). 
145. Id. at 615. 
146. In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007). 
147. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007). 
148. Id. at 74. 
149. Id.  
150. Id. at 74–75. 
151. 553 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2009). 
152. See id. at 1219. 
153. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 28.  
154. See Frydman & Desai, supra note 83, at 23 (citing In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 
(B.I.A. 2008)). 
155. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584. 
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may be delimited or ascertained.”
156
 The proposed PSG from In re S-E-
G- contained too many variables to pass the particularity test.
157
 
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
advises its own asylum officers that “[p]articular social groups defined 
in terms that are amorphous, indeterminate, subjective, inchoate, or 
variable will fail the particularity requirement because membership in 
groups defined in this manner are difficult to delimit.”
158
 If there is no 
way to tell a member of the group from a non-member of the group, then 
it does not pass the particularity requirement, and thus the group fails the 
three-prong test established by the BIA.
159
 
The BIA’s three-prong test remained unchanged until the Ninth 
Circuit’s 2013 Henriquez-Rivas decision.
160
 Henriquez-Rivas sought to 
reconcile post-Acosta decisions with the “social visibility” requirement 
introduced by In re C-A-.
161
 “Immutability” and “particularity” continue 
to play an essential role in the BIA’s PSG analysis, but circuit courts are 
beginning to reevaluate their stance on the application of “social 
visibility” to situations where people are actively trying to conceal their 
group membership from persecutors.
162
 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL VISIBILITY 
REQUIREMENT 
The definition of “particular social group” remains ambiguous despite 
BIA attempts to clarify it.
163
 After continued debate among the circuit 
courts, the BIA issued two decisions in 2014 to give clarity to lower 
                                                     
156. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 28. 
157. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584–85. 
158. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 28. 
159. PSGs that are defined by terrorism, criminal activity, or other persecutory activity also fail 
the three-prong test established by In re C-A-. See Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that current or former 
gang membership is not considered a particular social group due to the gang members’ criminal 
activities). 
160. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 
(B.I.A. 2014). These opinions were both issued in 2014, one year after Henriquez-Rivas. 
161. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013). 
162. See Rojas-Pérez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2012) (recognizing the persuasiveness of 
the “social visibility” analyses from Gatimi and Valdiviezo-Galdamez); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that after Acosta, the BIA recognized a 
number of PSGs that lacked “social visibility”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that “member[s] of a group that [have] been targeted for assassination or torture or some 
other mode of persecution . . . will take pains to avoid being socially visible”). 
163. See Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). 
13 - Carr.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:12 PM 
2016] KILL THE SNITCH 1333 
 
courts and potential asylum seekers.
164
 The BIA’s holdings in In re M-E-
V-G-
165
 and In re W-G-R-
166
 emphasized that “social visibility” is 
concerned with whether society recognizes the PSG as “socially 
distinct.”
167
 It does not mean the group must be literally visible to the 
naked eye—known as “on-sight” visibility.
168
 Some circuits continue to 
struggle with the concept of social visibility.
169
 Meanwhile, the Ninth 
Circuit rejects “on-sight” visibility and instead utilizes its “social 
distinction” analysis developed in 2008, six years before the BIA’s 
decisions in In re M-E-V-G- and W-G-R.
170
  
A. Henriquez-Rivas Replaced the BIA’s “On-Sight” Visibility 
Requirement in Favor of “Social Distinction” 
After Rocio Brenda Henriquez-Rivas’ father was murdered in El 
Salvador in 1998, she identified two of the suspects and testified against 
them in court.
171
 Although both suspects were convicted, one of them 
was released from prison early.
172
 Henriquez-Rivas escaped to the 
United States because she believed that the gang members responsible 
for her father’s death would try to harm her for testifying against them in 
                                                     
164. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 
(B.I.A. 2014). 
165. 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). In re M-E-V-G- concerned a Honduran youth that 
claimed membership in a particular social group, “namely Honduran youths who have been actively 
recruited by gangs but who have refused to join because they oppose gangs.” Id. at 228. The BIA 
held that “literal or ‘ocular’ visibility is not required” and renamed the “social visibility” element as 
“social distinction.” Id. 
166. 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). In W-G-R-, the asylum applicant fled El Salvador 
because he feared persecution as a member of the proposed PSG consisting of former M-18 gang 
members who renounced their gang membership. The BIA eliminated the need for a PSG to be 
socially visible with its holding in W-G-R-. “To be socially distinct, a group need not be seen by 
society; it must instead be perceived by society.” Id. at 216 (emphasis in original). 
167. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., supra note 121, at 4. 
168. Id. 
169. See supra note 15. 
170. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Henriquez-
Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit first adopted the “social 
distinction” test with its decision in Santos-Lemus. Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1088. The 
proposed group in Santos-Lemus, “young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence,” failed the 
“social distinction” test because the group was generally unrecognizable by others in the 
community. Because the harassment Santos-Lemus suffered was part of widespread criminality and 
civil unrest throughout El Salvador, the Ninth Circuit found that he was at no more risk to violence 
than young males that did not resist gang recruitment. Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 746. 
171. Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1086. 
172. Id. 
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 The immigration judge presiding over Henriquez-Rivas’ case 
held she was a member of a PSG as previously defined by the BIA—
”people testifying against or otherwise oppos[ing] gang members.”
174
 
However, the BIA reversed the immigration judge’s finding because it 
believed Henriquez-Rivas’ proposed PSG was too amorphous and not 
socially visible.
175




The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the BIA’s decision relied heavily on 
the BIA’s opinions from In re Acosta and In re C-A-.
177
 During its 
discussion of “social visibility” in In re C-A-, the BIA referenced former 
military leadership and land ownership as examples of “easily 
recognizable traits.”
178
 However, the Ninth Circuit was keen to point out 
“[t]hose traits would not be ‘easily recognizable’ if the ‘social visibility’ 
criterion required ‘on-sight’ visibility, because former military officers 
do not always wear epaulets, nor do landowners wear T-shirts mapping 
their holdings.”
179
 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the key to the BIA’s 
own precedent is not ocular recognition of a group, but whether the 
social group is understood by others in society to constitute a social 
group.
180
 Accordingly, if the social group is out of public view, it 
“should be understood in the context of societal understanding”—not 
whether it is visible to the naked eye.
181
 The Ninth Circuit looked to the 
BIA’s interpretation of “social visibility” in In re C-A- to arrive at the 
conclusion that “on-sight” visibility is unnecessary to the PSG analysis: 
We emphasize that to render C-A-’s statements consistent with a 
proper understanding of “social visibility,” the requirement that 
an applicant’s conduct has “come to the attention of” his 
persecutors must not be construed to exclude all conduct that 
occurs “out of the public view.” If an applicant can demonstrate 
                                                     
173. Id. In addition to serving prison sentences, the gang members were also forced to pay 
restitution to the Henriquez-Rivas family. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1093. 
176. Id. at 1083. 
177. Id. at 1088. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 1088 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006)). The Henriquez-Rivas 
court “believe[d] that the perception of the persecutors may matter the most.” Flores-Rios v. Lynch, 
807 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Henriquez–Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1087). However, in 2015, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the persecutor’s perception in assessing the social visibility 
requirement was unnecessary. See id.  
181. Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1088. 
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as a factual matter that he reasonably fears persecution because 
some covert action that he has taken may “come to the attention 
of” his persecutors, then it is irrelevant whether the action would 




The court determined that Henriquez-Rivas satisfied the “social 
visibility” requirement when she “[came] to the attention” of the gang by 
testifying against her father’s killers in court.
183
 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit considered evidence that Salvadoran society recognized “the 
unique vulnerability” of people who testify against gangs.
184
 The court 
referenced a 2006 witness protection law enacted to protect people who 




Membership in Henriquez-Rivas’ proposed PSG was easy to verify 
and therefore delimited.
186
 Unlike the applicant in In re S-E-G-, 
Henriquez-Rivas belonged to a PSG that could “accurately be described 
in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be 
recognized . . . as a discrete class of persons.”
187
 The Ninth Circuit relied 
on country conditions evidence to find that Salvadoran society 
recognizes witnesses who testify against gang members as a distinct 
group.
188




Henriquez-Rivas eliminated the need for a PSG to be visible to the 
eye.
190
 The Ninth Circuit used Henriquez-Rivas to expand on its earlier 
holding from Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey
191
 and reinforced its position 
that “social visibility” means “social distinction.”
192
 By looking to 
                                                     
182. Id. at 1088 n.7.  




187. Id. at 1093 (citing In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008)). 
188. Id. at 1088. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008). 
192. The Henriquez-Rivas court did not use the words “social distinction” to describe the “social 
visibility” requirement, but its holding—a proposed group must “be perceived as a group by 
society”—has been understood to mean “social distinction.” Flores-Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 
1127 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1088–89). The BIA’s 2014 decision in M-
E-V-G- formally “recast the ‘social visibility’ requirement as one of ‘social distinction.’” Id. at 
1127. 
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society’s perceptions of the group, rather than visible recognition, the 
Ninth Circuit sought to reconcile the BIA’s prior inconsistent rulings on 
“social visibility.”
193
 As discussed earlier, the BIA recognized numerous 
PSGs that lacked “on-sight” recognition during the time between In re 
Acosta and In re C-A-.
194
 Henriquez-Rivas served as a benchmark to 
which the BIA could look for guidance in future PSG determinations.
195
 
B. Where We Are Today: How “Social Distinction” Fits into the 
BIA’s Particular Social Group Analysis 
The BIA revisited the meaning of “social visibility” just one year 
after the Ninth Circuit decided Henriquez-Rivas.
196
 The BIA intended to 
use In re M-E-V-G- and W-F-R- to clarify the ambiguity surrounding the 
“social visibility” requirement and address the criticism coming out of 
the circuit courts.
197
 To arrive at a more practical understanding of 
“social visibility,” the BIA referenced the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in 
Henriquez-Rivas.
198
 The BIA never intended “social visibility” to be 
read literally,
199
 which is why the BIA renamed the requirement “social 
distinction” and emphasized the need for a PSG to be perceived or 
recognized by society, but not seen.
200
 
Both In re M-E-V-G- and In re W-G-R- concerned Central American 
youths who feared persecution by gangs.
201
 In In re M-E-V-G-, the BIA 
was tasked with determining whether “Honduran youth[s] who have 
been actively recruited by gangs but who have refused to join because 
they oppose the gangs” satisfied the three-prong PSG test developed 
from In re Acosta, In re C-A-, and In re S-E-G-.
202
 Specifically, the BIA 
                                                     
193. See Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1088. 
194. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011). 
195. See Flores-Rios, 807 F.3d 1123. 
196. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 234 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014). 
197. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 234 (“We believe that these [social group] requirements 
provide guidance to courts . . . [and] are necessary to address the evolving nature of claims asserted 
[on account of membership in a PSG].”); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214. The BIA briefly 
addressed “particularity” in each opinion and noted its overlap with “social visibility.” “This 
[overlap] occurs because both ‘particularity’ and ‘social visibility’ take account of the societal 
context specific to the claim for relief[,] . . . [but] it is necessary to address both elements to 
properly determine whether the group is cognizable . . . .” In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214.  
198. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240. 
199. Id.  
200. Id. 
201. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228; In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 209. 
202. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228. 
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sought to provide clarification on the most confusing of the three 
requirements: “social visibility.”
203
 With its decision in In re M-E-V-G-, 
the BIA ultimately removed “social visibility” as a requirement for 
proposed PSGs and concluded that “[s]ociety can consider persons to 




The BIA reached the same conclusion in In re W-G-R- that it reached 
in In re M-E-V-G-, and even incorporated similar language and authority 
in each opinion.
205
 The BIA admitted that its “use of the word ‘visibility’ 
unintentionally promoted confusion” and needed to be replaced.
206
 The 
BIA settled on “social distinction” as a more practical tool for evaluating 
PSGs.
207
 “[S]ocial distinction exists where the relevant society 
perceives, considers, or recognizes the group as a distinct social 
group.”
208
 In arriving at its decision to replace “social visibility” in favor 
of “social distinction,” the BIA pointed to the fact that the court had 
recognized numerous groups that lacked ocular visibility during the time 
between In re Acosta and In re C-A-.
209
 According to the BIA, under the 
“social distinction” test, it would not have mattered that the groups 
lacked visibility, so long as society understood that the groups shared a 
common characteristic that defined them.
210
 
Despite the BIA’s attempts to refine the PSG requirements, some 
circuits consider the “social visibility” criteria inconsistent
211
 and in need 
of further clarification.
212
 The Seventh Circuit was the first of the circuit 
courts to push back on the BIA’s “social visibility” requirement and 
continues to adhere exclusively to the BIA’s Acosta immutability 
                                                     
203. Id. at 236. 
204. Id. at 240. 
205. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237 (“[A]n applicant for asylum or withholding of 
removal seeking relief based on ‘membership in a particular social group’ must establish that the 
group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with 
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. at 208 (PSG membership requires “a common immutable characteristic, defined with 
particularity, and socially distinct within the society in question”). 
206. In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216. 




211. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). 
212. See Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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 In 2011, the Third Circuit rejected the “social visibility” 
requirement because it “would pose an unsurmountable obstacle to 
refugee status” for those groups that previously qualified as PSGs under 
the Acosta standard.
214
 It remains to be seen whether the Third Circuit is 
willing to adopt the “social distinction” requirement introduced by In re 
M-E-V-G- and In re W-G-R-. 
In re M-E-V-G- and In re W-G-R- also briefly addressed the issue of 
perspective as it relates to whether a group is socially distinct.
215
 In other 
words, should courts consider the recognition of a social group from the 
perspective of the persecutor or the perspective of society? In 
Henriquez-Rivas, the Ninth Circuit looked to the persecutor’s 
perspective.
216
 The Second Circuit also considers “social visibility” from 
the perspective of the persecutor, as well as the outside world.
217
 The 
BIA, on the other hand, bases its determination on the general perception 
of society.
218
 While the BIA recognizes the value of viewing the group 
from the persecutor’s perspective, it believes that doing so would 
“conflate the fact of the persecution with the reasons for it.”
219
 In 2015, 
the Ninth Circuit changed its stance and adopted the BIA’s view that 
“social distinction” requires the group to be perceived by society.
220
 
C. Gang-Related Particular Social Groups Receive Varied Treatment 
from the Circuit Courts Because There Is No Universal 
Understanding of Particular Social Group Requirements 
In October 2015, The Guardian published an exposé detailing the 
imminent threat of violence that countless Central American immigrants 
face when the United States government deports them back to their 
                                                     
213. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., supra note 121, at 3; Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 
669 (7th Cir. 2013). 
214. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011). Additionally, the 
Third Circuit reasoned that “social visibility” and “particularity” were not entitled to Chevron 
deference because the BIA did not provide a “principled reason” for adopting these new 
requirements. Id. 
215. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 241–42 (B.I.A. 2014). 
216. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013). 
217. See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
218. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242. 
219. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., supra note 121, at 8; In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
at 242 (“The perception of the applicant’s persecutors may be relevant, because it can be indicative 
of whether society views the group as distinct.”). 
220. Flores-Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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 José Marvin Martínez was one of three Honduran 
immigrants whose story was chronicled by The Guardian.
222
 Martinez 
fled to the United States in 2013 after gang members killed his 
brother.
223
 He was deported back to Honduras in August 2014 and 
murdered just four months later when a gunman shot him on a street 
corner.
224
 Martinez’s story demonstrates the overwhelming value that 
obtaining asylum protection can have for Central American individuals 
who have a well-founded fear of gang violence. 
A number of circuit courts have ruled on gang-related PSGs with 
mixed results.
225
 For example, while the Sixth
226
 and Seventh Circuits
227
 
recognize a PSG comprised of former gang members, the Ninth Circuit 
rejects that same PSG for policy reasons.
228
 According to the Ninth 
Circuit, Congress did not intend to offer refugee status to “violent street 
gangs who assault people and who traffic drugs and commit theft.”
229
 
The Seventh Circuit disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, 




Witnesses to gang crimes, such as Jaime from Part I, have also 
created confusion among the circuit courts.
231
 Henriquez-Rivas applied a 
                                                     
221. Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central American Migrants 





225. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing witnesses 
who testify against gang members as a PSG); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting potential gang recruits as a PSG because the group was amorphous); Garcia v. Attorney 
Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 498 (3d Cir. 2011) (recognizing witnesses who testify against gang members as 
a PSG); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 367 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that former gang 
members would be easily recognizable); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 
2009) (finding that current gang membership does not satisfy the PSG requirement but implies that 
perhaps former gang members may satisfy that requirement); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 
945–46 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding a group of current but inactive gang members too amorphous). 
226. See Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 366–67. 
227. Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 429. 
228. Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 945–46. 
229. Id. 
230. Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 429–30. 
231. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting the confusion 
between “particularity” and “social visibility” in finding that witnesses who testify to serious gang 
crimes satisfy the PSG requirements); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 159 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding 
that Honduran teenagers threatened with gang recruitment did not satisfy the “particularity” 
requirement because the group was too amorphous); Garcia v. Attorney Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 504 (3d 
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“social distinction” test to recognize asylum eligibility for witnesses who 
testify to gang crimes.
232
 The Third Circuit, relying on the Acosta 
immutability standard, also recognized that witnesses who testify against 
gang members are members of a PSG.
233
 The Fourth Circuit’s holding in 
Zelaya v. Holder
234
 is a departure from the Third and Ninth Circuits.
235
 
Zelaya feared persecution because of his membership in a group 
consisting of “young Honduran males who (1) refuse[d] to join the Mara 
Salvatrucha 13 gang (MS-13 gang), (2) have notified the authorities of 
MS-13’s harassment tactics, and (3) have an identifiable tormentor 
within MS-13.”
236
 Unlike Henriquez-Rivas, Zelaya did not testify 
against the gang.
237
 The Fourth Circuit failed to recognize Zelaya’s 




The Zelaya holding should not affect the PSG analysis for a person in 
Jaime’s situation for two reasons. First, the Court decided Zelaya before 
the BIA issued its opinions in In re M-E-V-G- and In re W-G-R-, which 
adopted the “social distinction” requirement and emphasized the 
importance of “social distinction.”
239
 As a result, the Fourth Circuit did 
not use a “social distinction” analysis to reject Zelaya’s proposed 
PSG.
240
 In fact, the Fourth Circuit is the only circuit court that has 
declined to adequately address the application of “social visibility” as a 
requirement to the PSG analysis, much less “social distinction.”
241
 
However, in his concurrence, Judge Floyd indicated that a group of 
                                                     
Cir. 2011) (recognizing the membership of only one of two sisters in a PSG comprised of 
Guatemalans that testify against gang members). 
232. Flores-Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015). 
233. See Garcia, 665 F.3d at 496. 
234. 668 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2012). 
235. See Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 159.  
236. Id. at 162. 
237. Id. at 163. 
238. Id. at 166. 
239. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
208, 208 (B.I.A. 2014). 
240. Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 166 (“The critical problem with Zelaya’s proposed social group for 
purposes of seeking asylum is that it fails the BIA’s particularity requirement. First, as we have 
previously recognized, opposition to gangs is an amorphous characteristic . . . .”). 
241. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 910 (4th Cir. 2014) (the court did not address “social 
visibility” because Martinez failed the “immutability” prong); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 
F.3d 117, 125–26 (4th Cir. 2011) (“social visibility” was not mentioned when determining the 
validity of the claim); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 446–47 (4th Cir. 2011) (the claim was 
considered too amorphous to be valid). 
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prosecution witnesses to gang crimes would satisfy both the 
“particularity” and “social distinction” criteria.
242
 
Second, Zelaya is not a case about witnesses who report gang 
violence to police.
243
 It is a case about gang recruitment.
244
 Although 
Zelaya was harassed and threatened for not joining a gang, he did not 
witness a serious gang crime and then report that serious gang crime to 
law enforcement.
245
 He complained twice to the police about being 
harassed by gangs which, according to the Fourth Circuit, “adds 
little . . . in the face of the common sense proposition that MS-13 would 
look unfavorably upon anyone who complained about its harassment 
tactics to the police.”
246
 Henriquez-Rivas and Jaime both witnessed a 
murder—a far more serious crime than threatening someone for not 
joining a gang. Jaime’s proposed PSG is unaffected by Zelaya because 
his group is not amorphous and passes the “particularity” requirement 
that Zelaya’s group failed.
247
 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s PSG 
analysis from Zelaya differs significantly from the current BIA “social 
distinction” analysis. Therefore, Zelaya does not apply to Jaime’s case. 
III. RECOGNIZING A NEW PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
On January 13, 2016, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced 
that the United States would expand refugee screenings to people fleeing 
violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
248
 Just two days 
before Kerry’s announcement, the Peace Corps suspended its program in 
El Salvador due to the “ongoing security environment.”
249
 Immigration 
advocates expressed concern that the United States was willing to deport 
Salvadorans back to El Salvador while terminating the Peace Corps 
                                                     
242. Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 169 (Floyd, J., concurring). 
243. Id. at 166 (Zelaya is primarily concerned with evaluating “[r]esisting gang recruitment” as a 
PSG). 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 162–63. To be clear, Zelaya was beaten by gangs and threatened with death on several 
occasions.  
246. Id. at 166. 
247. Part III discusses “particularity” and how it applies to individuals similarly situated to Jaime. 
248. Cedar Attanasio, John Kerry Announces Refugee Program Expansion in Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador with UN Help, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.latintimes.com/john-kerry-announces-refugee-program-expansion-guatemala-honduras-
and-el-salvador-un-364297 [https://perma.cc/V6PQ-FSVC]. 
249. Press Release, Peace Corps, Peace Corps El Salvador Program Suspended (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://www.peacecorps.gov/news/library/peace-corps-el-salvador-program-suspended/ 
[https://perma.cc/MS4A-Q4LX]. 
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program because of increased violence in the country.
250
 The 
announcements prove the United States government was aware of the 
nexus between Central American gang violence and an increase in the 
number of refugees fleeing the region.
251
 
Although the United States recognizes the risks associated with being 
a witness to a serious gang crime, it has been reluctant to extend 
immigration relief to these witnesses and other individuals similarly 
situated to Jaime. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress passed 
legislation to accommodate informants by making the S Visa a 
permanent provision
252
 The S Visa provides temporary immigration 
status to “aliens who provide critical, reliable information necessary to 
the successful investigation or prosecution of a criminal 
organization . . .”
253
 In 2012, the United States Treasury Department 
opened the door for someone in Jaime’s position to obtain an S Visa by 
designating the MS-13 as a “transnational criminal organization,” but 
MS-13 informants may only obtain an S Visa if they have already made 
it across the border and into the United States.
254
 Congress only allows a 
total of two-hundred S Visas per year,
255
 and it is unclear how many, if 
any, of these visas are being designated for MS-13 informants.
256
 It is 
problematic that the United States only recognizes S Visas for 
                                                     
250. Jerry Markon, Peace Corps Suspends El Salvador Program as Violence Surges, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-
eye/wp/2016/01/14/peace-corps-suspends-el-salvador-program-as-violence-surges/ 
[https://perma.cc/G827-FGUH]. 
251. John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks on the United States Foreign Policy Agenda for 2016 
(Jan. 13, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/251177.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QMS5-WCS2]) (“[W]e have plans to expand the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program in order to help vulnerable families and individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras, and offer them a safe and legal alternative to the dangerous journey that many are 
tempted to begin . . . .”). 
252. KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21043, IMMIGRATION: S VISAS FOR CRIMINAL 
AND TERRORIST INFORMANTS 1 (2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21043.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8TD9-UPLQ]. The S Visa was originally scheduled to expire on September 13, 
2001. The new law amended the INA “to provide permanent authority for the administration of the 
‘S’ Visa.” Id.  
253. OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1862 (2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1862-s-visa-program-eligibility 
[https://perma.cc/9Z78-Y2XL]. U.S. law enforcement generally reaches out to potential S Visa 
candidates.  
254. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EL SALVADOR: BACKGROUND AND 
U.S. RELATIONS 19 (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43616.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XW4D-2V8W]. 
255. See OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, supra note 253. 
256. It is unlikely the U.S. would see much value in obtaining intelligence information from most 
witnesses fleeing gang violence in the Northern Triangle. 
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informants who are already present in the United States. However, the 
existence of the S Visa program is still persuasive for extending 
protection to Jaime and other witnesses alike because it serves as 
evidence that the United States government is willing to acknowledge 
the danger and value of informants. 
A. Witnesses Who Report Serious Gang Crimes to Law Enforcement 
Are Members of a Particular Social Group 
Jaime’s PSG
257
—Salvadoran witnesses who report serious gang 
crimes to law enforcement—passes both the BIA’s three-prong test and 
the Acosta immutability standard followed by the Third and Seventh 
Circuits. Courts that incorporate the “social distinction” prong in their 
PSG analysis may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence to 
demonstrate persecution on account of membership in a PSG.
258
 In 
Jaime’s case, Salvadoran society’s perception of witnesses who report 
gang crimes is shaped by the power and influence of El Salvador’s 
gangs.
259
 Evidence of this influence establishes the basis for creating a 
new PSG that does not require a witness to a serious gang crime to 
testify in court against gang members. 
The BIA’s immutability standard is satisfied if the common 
characteristic that defines members of the group cannot be changed.
260
 
The immutability requirement from In re Acosta has been endorsed by 
all of the federal circuit courts of appeals.
261
 Because witnesses that 
report serious gang crimes cannot change what they have already seen 
and undo their report to law enforcement, witnesses such as Jaime pass 
                                                     
257. While this Comment focuses almost exclusively on El Salvador, it is intended to serve as a 
guide for witnesses to gang crimes around the globe. For example, witnesses from Guatemala and 
Honduras may rely on similar evidence to make the same argument that they are members of a PSG. 
258. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. PART III, supra note 11, at 32. “To determine 
whether the applicant has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
his or her membership in a particular social group, the asylum officer must elicit and consider all 
evidence, direct and circumstantial, providing information about the motivation of the persecutor.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). For example, country conditions reports are relevant circumstantial 
evidence that can be used to establish the persecutor’s motives. Id. at 13. 
259. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Evidence such as country 
conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, 
historical animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists and is perceived as 
‘distinct’ . . . in a particular society.”); see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., supra note 121, at 
6. Pro-immigration critics argue that In re M-E-V-G- precludes pro se applicants from gaining 
asylum because “the BIA requires an asylum applicant to formulate a group in terms which are 
statistically precise,” which often requires a lawyer. 
260. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
261. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., supra note 121, at 1. 
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 If Jaime’s case were heard in either the 
Third or Seventh Circuits, his PSG would likely be recognized by the 
sheer fact that the shared characteristic of the group is immutable.
263
 The 
more interesting debate is whether Jaime’s proposed PSG also meets the 
additional “social distinction” requirement followed by the Ninth Circuit 
and the BIA. 
Circuits that require “social visibility” should rely on the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Henriquez-Rivas to evaluate the validity of a 
proposed PSG that recognizes witnesses who report serious gang crimes 
for two reasons. First, the majority of immigrants fleeing the Northern 
Triangle eventually resettle in the Ninth Circuit, which means their cases 
are most frequently heard in the Ninth Circuit.
264
 Second, Henriquez-
Rivas has already provided the Ninth Circuit with an established 
framework for analyzing asylum claims involving witnesses to gang 
crimes.
265
 Analyzing Jaime’s PSG merely requires the Ninth Circuit to 
refocus its “social distinction” analysis from Henriquez-Rivas and 
evaluate the dangers that Henriquez-Rivas would have faced from the 
M-18 before she testified against them in court. By eliminating the 
“social visibility” requirement and replacing it with “social distinction,” 
Henriquez-Rivas shifts the focus from the troubling task of assessing a 
group’s visual recognition to assessing whether society understands the 
group exists.
266
 After determining the group is “socially distinct,” a court 




For Jaime to meet the “particularity” requirement, he must establish 
that his PSG is easy for Salvadoran society to accurately describe.
268
 
Unlike the PSG at issue in In re S-E-G-, Salvadoran witnesses who 
report serious gang crimes to law enforcement are easily defined by 
                                                     
262. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
263. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney 
Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011). 
264. See Immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in U.S., 2009–2013, 
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/ 
immigrants-el-salvador-guatemala-and-honduras-us-2009-2013?width=1000&height=850&iframe 
=true [https://perma.cc/UB72-AAGP]. 28% of all Central American immigrants have settled in 
California. Id. Of the 2,589,000 immigrants from the Northern Triangle residing in the United 
States, almost 20%, 505,000 people, live in the greater Los Angeles area. Id. More than one-quarter 
of all Salvadorans living in the United States reside in California. Id. 
265. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087–92 (9th Cir. 2013). 
266. Id. at 1088 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006)). 
267. Id. at 1090. 
268. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008). 
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Salvadoran society. Witnesses like Jaime do not belong to an amorphous 
class that lacks definition.
269
 In In re S-E-G-, the BIA rejected a group 
comprised of “male children who lack stable families and meaningful 
adult protection, who are from middle and low income classes, who live 
in the territories controlled by the MS-13 gang, and who refuse 
recruitment.”
270
 This group failed “particularity” because it was not 
easily identifiable
271
 and “people’s ideas of what those terms mean can 
vary.”
272
 Conversely, membership in Jaime’s group is specifically 
limited to individuals who complete a two-step process—witness a 
serious gang crime and report it to law enforcement. Courts that are 
provided with enough evidence to recognize Jaime’s group as “socially 
distinct” will likely find his group also satisfies the “particularity” 
requirement. 
1. Kill the Snitch: Salvadoran Witnesses Risk Their Lives to Report 
Serious Gang Crimes to Law Enforcement 
Using the rationale of In re C-A-, the BIA determined that “[social] 
visibility is limited to those informants who are discovered because they 
appear as witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel 
members.”
273
 By reporting gang crimes to Salvadoran law enforcement, 
witnesses like Jaime come to the attention of gang members due to 
widespread gang influence and police corruption.
274
 El Salvador’s 
country conditions establish that witnesses who report serious gang 
crimes are “socially distinct” within Salvadoran society.
275
 Country 
conditions provide courts with “information about the context in which 
the . . . persecution took place,” so courts can effectively evaluate the 
                                                     
269. Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1085 (“The group [in In re S-E-G-] lacked ‘particularity’ 
because the category was too ‘amorphous’ and the group membership was not easily definable.”). 
270. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 585.  
271. Id. at 584 (citing In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73–74 (B.I.A. 2007)). 
272. Id. (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76). 
273. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 959, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (emphasis added).  
274. La Mara Salvatrucha Queria Tomar el Control del Congreso de Honduras, 
ELSALVADOR.COM (Apr. 28, 2016, 8:01 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/internacional/ 
mara-salvatrucha-queria-tomar-control-del-congreso-honduras-110969 [https://perma.cc/ZAV8-
NDMS] (author translation). An investigation revealed that the Mara Salvatrucha invested more 
than $500,000 in a local mayor with the hope that they could get him elected as president of the 
National Congress; El Salvador: Police Corruption and Abuse, IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF 
CAN., § 2 (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.refworld.org/docid/560b85ce4.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2016). 
275. See Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2000) (for usefulness of country 
conditions). 
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 In El Salvador,
277
 there is overwhelming 
evidence that proves witnesses who report serious gang crimes to law 
enforcement are at risk of being seriously harmed or even killed.
278
 
Salvadoran society recognizes the risks associated with reporting gang 
crimes to police.
279
 The evidence presented in this Comment suggests 
that Salvadoran society also recognizes that witnesses who report gang 
crimes to police are members of a “socially distinct” group. 
In 2015, El Salvador became the “murder capital of the world”
280
 by 
averaging almost sixteen murders a day and nearly 7,000 for the entire 
year.
281
 The majority of these killings are understood to be either the 
result of gang violence or the extrajudicial police killings of gang 
members.
282
 This brutal police practice, known as mano dura, involves 
sending military and police into the streets to confront gang members 
and arrest them.
283
 Mano dura has only exacerbated the problem of gang 
                                                     
276. Id. 
277. While this Comment focuses almost exclusively on El Salvador, the same arguments can be 
applied to places with similar levels of gang violence. 
278. For example, in May 2015, M-18 murdered a man because it suspected he was an informant. 
Jorge Beltrán Luna, Aumento de Homicidios por Sospechas de que Son Informantes de la Policia, 
ELSALVADOR.COM (May 20, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/aumento-
homicidios-por-sospechas-que-son-informantes-policia-75396 [https://perma.cc/4S8M-LVJP] 
(author translation); see also Repunte de Homicidios en el Área de la Matanza, ELSALVADOR.COM 
(Mar. 3, 2016, 10:08 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/repunte-homicidios-area-
matanza-103678 [https://perma.cc/2YBL-27BJ] (discussing how two healthcare workers were killed 
in March 2016 because the MS-13 suspected they reported witnessing a murder to police) (author 
translation). 
279. Sarah Kinosian & Angelika Albaladejo, El Salvador’s Security Strategy in 2016: Change or 
More Mano Dura?, LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.lawg.org/action-
center/lawg-blog/69-general/1599-el-salvadors-security-strategy-in-2016-change-or-more-mano-
dura- [https://perma.cc/MMV6-WRCF ] (“[A] culture of silence with regards to corruption and 
violence has been created” by gang threats to kill those that speak to police); see also Una Clica 
Controla el Barrio San Jacinto, ELSALVADOR.COM (Dec. 20, 2015, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/una-clica-controla-barrio-san-jacinto-96646 
[https://perma.cc/2HG7-Q2Y6] (in the community of Harrison Step, a journalist observed “a 
warning painted on a wall: kill the snitch” (author translation)). 
280. Alan Gomez, El Salvador: World’s New Murder Capital, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2016, 10:15 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/01/07/el-salvador-homicide-rate-honduras-
guatemala-illegal-immigration-to-united-states/78358042/ [https://perma.cc/VWC7-U3T9]. 
281.  Nina Lakhani, Violent Deaths in El Salvador Spiked 70% in 2015, Figures Reveal, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2016, 6:14 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/04/el-salvador-
violence-deaths-murder-2015 [https://perma.cc/9RJW-PPXE] (stating that around 6,657 people 
were murdered in 2015, a 70% increase in violent deaths from 2014). 
282. Id. 
283. See Kinosian & Albaladejo, supra note 279. El Salvador also implemented mano dura from 
2003 to 2009, but its practice failed to reduce murder rates. For many incarcerated gang members, 
prison was an opportunity to consolidate groups and expand criminal networks.  
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violence as gangs have redoubled their efforts to assert control over 
disputed areas of El Salvador and evade arrest.
284
 Because of this 
conflict, people are reluctant to report information to the police 
regarding criminal gang activity for fear of gang reprisal.
285
 
Fear of gang violence is so prevalent throughout the country that even 
police officers wear masks to conceal their identities from gangs.
286
 
Organized attacks on police officers and their families are common.
287
 
This helps explain why witnesses choose not to testify against gangs; 
they fear gangs will respond by harming them and their families.
288
 In 
April 2015, a seventy-nine-year-old man was dragged out of his house 
and stabbed to death.
289
 After killing him, M-18 members sent a message 
to the community by hanging a piece of cardboard around the man’s 
neck with the phrase “for snitching.”
290
 
In El Salvador, there is no guarantee a witness’s identity will be 
protected or that gangs will be prosecuted for their crimes.
291
 In 
                                                     
284. See Lakhani, supra note 281. 
285. See Kinosian & Albaladejo, supra note 279 (“People are afraid that if they report [gang 
crimes] . . . that people will come after them.”). 
286. Joshua Partlow, El Salvador Debates Which Is Worse: Gangs or Police?, THESTAR.COM 
(May 25, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/05/25/el-salvador-debates-which-is-
worse-gangs-or-police.html [https://perma.cc/WJ5N-5USV ] (“[Police] in black masks are sweeping 
through this city . . . .”); see also Lakhani, supra note 281 (“[G]angs are rapidly and violently 
expanding into even the smallest rural communities in order to run extortion rings and control 
territory.”); Gangs of El Salvador, VICE NEWS (Dec. 1, 2015), https://news.vice.com/video/gangs-
of-el-salvador-full-length [https://perma.cc/3MFY-QJ5F]. 
287. Beatriz Calderón, Capturan a Dos Pandilleros por el Homicidio de la Madre de un Policía, 
LA PRENSA GRAFICA (May 10, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2016/05/10/ 
capturan-a-dos-pandilleros-por-el-homicidio-de-la-madre-de-un-policia [https://perma.cc/P7RB-
V3QE] (author translation); see also Capturan a Tres Implicados en Homicidio de Policía en San 
Miguel, ELSALVADOR.COM (Apr. 29, 2016, 4:19 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/ 
capturan-tres-implicados-homicidio-policia-san-miguel-111134 [https://perma.cc/XW2T-37LE] 
(author translation). In April 2016, three gang members murdered a police officer on his day off. Id. 
288. Jorge Beltran Luna, San Hilario Se Resiste a Vivir bajo Control de la MS, 
ELSALVADOR.COM (Apr. 2, 2016, 8:30 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/san-
hilario-resiste-vivir-bajo-control-106407 [https://perma.cc/J79P-MDF2] (discussing how witnesses 
are especially reluctant to come forward in communities where gang members have family) (author 
translation); Suchit Chavez, “Medio Millón” Exonerado de Homicidios por Falta de Testigo, LA 
PRENSA GRAFICA (Oct. 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2015/10/29/medio-
millon-exonerado-de-homicidios-por-falta-de-testigo [https://perma.cc/44PL-CAGZ] (saying that 
money laundering charges were dropped against a key figure in the MS-13 gang because 
prosecutors were unable to locate the witness) (author translation).  
289. See Beltrán Luna, supra note 278. 
290. Id. 
291. See IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., supra note 274, at § 1. “The Global Corruption 
Barometer 2013, by Transparency International, notes that 87 percent of respondents declared that 
the Salvadoran police was ‘corrupt/extremely corrupt,’ and 18 percent said they had paid a bribe to 
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February 2015, gang members murdered a witness under police 
protection while he was waiting at a bus stop.
292
 Two months later, six 
gang members burst into the home of Reina Ortiz and shot her and her 
four-year-old daughter to death because Ortiz was planning to testify 
against the gang for murdering her brother in 2013.
293
 El Salvador’s 
criminal conviction rate is below 5%.
294
 Meanwhile, in neighboring 
Guatemala, only 3% of 250,000 gang complaints filed in 2011 were 
prosecuted.
295
 This failure to hold gangs criminally liable for their 
actions has led to a “sense of impunity”
296
 and freedom to operate.
297
 
In 2014, El Salvador’s Attorney General accused lawyers, judges, and 
police of accepting bribes from gangs in exchange for more favorable 
sentences.
298
 Even former President Mauricio Funes personally admitted 
to paying gangs for political support.
299
 Gangs have also begun using the 
                                                     
police officers.” Id. A former PNC (Policia Nacional Civil) director was linked to a relationship 
with criminal gangs. Id. at § 2; See also Alberto Arce, Bloodshed in El Salvador Reaching Levels of 
1980s Civil War, CNSNEWS.COM (June 22, 2015, 7:15 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ 
bloodshed-el-salvador-reaching-levels-1980s-civil-war [https://perma.cc/XJ6N-499L] (reporting 
that El Salvador arrested more than 12,000 gang members in 2015 “with little to show for it”). 
292. R. Solano et al., Pandilleros Asesinan a Testigo bajo Régimen de Protección, 
ELSALVADOR.COM (Feb. 24, 2015 11:40 AM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/ 
pandilleros-asesinan-testigo-bajo-regimen-proteccion-73684 [https://perma.cc/9LPT-ZE2M] (author 
translation). 
293. Jessel Santos, Matan a Testigo de Homicidio y Su Hija de 4 Años, LA PRENSA GRAFICA 
(May 19, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2015/05/19/matan-a-testigo-de-
homicidio-y-a-su-hija-de-4-aos [https://perma.cc/F8ZN-WWE8] (author translation). 
294. See Seelke, supra note 254, at 9. 
295. MICHAEL BOULTON, UNICEF, LIVING IN A WORLD OF VIOLENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE GANG PHENOMENON 28 (July 2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e3260a32.html (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Suchit Chávez, FGR Acusa a 127 por Corrupción en Juzgados, LA PRENSA GRAFICA (Aug. 
2, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2014/08/02/fgr-acusa-a-127-por-corrupcion-en-
juzgados [https://perma.cc/5GWP-WKBA] (saying that the Attorney General accused 127 people of 
influence peddling and bribery) (author translation). 
299. Roger Noriega, MS-13’s Secretly Backing Ruling Party in El Salvador, NEW YORK POST 
(Mar. 3, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/03/ms-13s-secretly-backing-ruling-party-in-el-
salvador/ [https://perma.cc/8HPN-992D]; see also Jessica Ávalos, Fiscal: Hay Alcaldes 
Involucrados con Pandillas, La PRENSA GRAFICA (Feb. 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2015/02/18/fiscal-hay-alcaldes-involucrados-con-pandillas 
[https://perma.cc/8B5V-95SU] (describing how, in 2015, the Attorney General’s Office announced 
an investigation that found many mayors throughout El Salvador “dedicated to working with gangs” 
(author translation)); Arron Daugherty, 3 Former El Salvador Presidents Investigated for 
Corruption, INSIGHT CRIME (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/three-el-
salvador-presidents-investigated-corruption [https://perma.cc/H8W8-XQEL] (“El Salvador’s last 
three presidential administrations, which span 15 years, have been marred by corruption 
allegations . . . .”). 
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same firearms exclusively reserved for El Salvador’s armed forces, 
which raises the question—is the government supplying the gangs with 
these weapons in exchange for support?
300
 The United States has 
recognized this corruption and level of sophistication since 2012, when 
it imposed financial sanctions against MS-13.
301
 A year later, Senator 
Patrick Leahy of Vermont spoke out against El Salvador’s police 
corruption and its lack of concern for improving public safety.
302
 Despite 
attempts to curtail the problem,
303
 claims of corruption persist today.
304
 
Once Jaime reports the crime he witnessed to law enforcement, he 
runs the risk that corrupt police officers will pass along his identity to 
gang members.
305
 Gangs routinely hire police officers to protect their 
                                                     
300. El Salvador, un País Desangrado por las Pandillas, EL COMERCIO (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://elcomercio.pe/mundo/latinoamerica/salvador-pais-desangrado-pandillas-fotos-noticia-
1863557 [https://perma.cc/Z2SK-69UH] (author translation); see also Freedom in the World 2015: 
El Salvador, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/el-salvador 
[https://perma.cc/M333-WV4G] (“In June 2014, the attorney general announced that Defense 
Minister David Munguía Payés was under investigation for involvement in arms trafficking, 
potentially to supply gangs.”). 
301. Hannah Stone, US Ranks MS-13 Alongside Zetas in Gang List, INSIGHT CRIME (Oct. 12, 
2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/us-ms13-zetas-transnational [https://perma.cc/ 
N2XV-7LQR]; see also Seelke, supra note 254, at 18 (“The U.S. government has funded anti-gang 
programs in El Salvador since 2008.”). 
302. Hector Silva, The Fixer and El Salvador’s Missed Opportunity, INSIGHT CRIME (Mar. 6, 
2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/the-fixer-and-el-salvadors-missed-opportunity 
[https://perma.cc/6XVB-DW8J] (“‘In the last few years I have seen how Salvadorans are victims of 
violence, of a corrupt police, of individuals in security positions who worry more about getting rich 
than improving conditions for their people.’”). 
303. See Nelson Renteria, U.N., El Salvador Launch U.S.-Backed Anti-Corruption Program, 
REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2016, 6:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-el-salvador-corruption-
idUSKCN0V32SG [https://perma.cc/5VZZ-GFYT]. In early 2016, the U.N. announced a U.S. 
financed program to combat corruption in El Salvador. Id.  
304. Eugenia Velásquez & Alex Torres, Se Revela Posible Negociación del FMLN con 
Pandilleros, ELSALVADOR.COM (May 7, 2016, 9:53 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/ 
nacional/revela-posible-negociacion-del-fmln-con-pandilleros-111978 [https://perma.cc/2YDN-
UUBD] (author translation). In May 2016, El Salvador’s El Faro newspaper revealed that the 
FMLN political party negotiated deals with the MS-13 and M-18 gangs in exchange for support in 
the 2014 presidential election. Id.; see also Seelke, supra note 254, at 19 (stating that in 2013, 
USAID suspended funding intended for individuals affected by the global financial crisis because it 
believed the money was ending up in gang members’ hands). 
305. See Una Clica Controla el Barrio San Jacinto, supra note 279 (“Police do not escape the 
control of the gangs. In fact, they may be the most controlled.” (author translation)); Oscar 
Martinez, The Gang Informant El Salvador Failed to Protect, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-gang-informant-el-salvador-failed-to-protect 
[https://perma.cc/NM8B-N35Q] (discussing how two police officers, Jose Wilfredo Tejada and 
Walter Misael Hernandez, detained a 23-year-old boy who was later tortured and murdered by a 
notorious M-13 member; the police informant that testified against Tejada, Hernandez, and the M-
13 member was also murdered). 
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ability to traffic drugs and commit other crimes.
306
 Between 2009 and 
2013, more than 500 police officers were arrested for corruption and 
involvement in criminal activities.
307
 Many of these officers worked with 
gangs by providing them information about witnesses who had reported 
gang crimes.
308
 Even today, there are reports that certain police officers 
are either gang members who have infiltrated the police, or they have 
family who are gang members they seek to protect.
309
 In fact, a recent 
VICE News investigation estimated that almost half a million people in 
El Salvador depend on the country’s 60,000 gang members for financial 
support.
310
 Another study commissioned by El Salvador’s Security 
Ministry estimated that as many as 470,000 citizens were in some way 
affiliated with gangs.
311
 This degree of gang dependency makes it 
challenging for people in Jaime’s position to escape gang detection. 
To evaluate “social distinction,” courts are encouraged to consider 
any criminal laws designed to protect victims of the proposed group.
312
 
As Henriquez-Rivas points out, “Salvadoran society recognizes the 
unique vulnerability of people who testify against gang members in 
criminal proceedings, because gang members are likely to target these 
individuals as a group.”
313
 In 2006, the El Salvador legislature passed a 
witness protection law to protect witnesses from dangerous criminals 
                                                     
306. Candy Gomez, Desarticulan Red de Corrupción en El Salvador, Entre Ellos Dos Jueces, 
STARMEDIA (July 30, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://noticias.starmedia.com/violencia-inseguridad/ 
desarticulan-red-corrupcion-en-salvador-entre-ellos-dos-jueces.html [https://perma.cc/BW8L-
UNZ4] (author translation). 
307. David Marroquín, Más de 500 Policías Detenidos Ligados a Hechos Delictivos, 
ELSALVADOR.COM (Apr. 14, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/mas-500-
policias-detenidos-ligados-hechos-delictivos-33694 [https://perma.cc/3UFD-GFPU] (the reporting 
officers were arrested for crimes ranging from extortion, bribery, theft, sexual assault, domestic 
violence, drug trafficking, and links to criminal gangs) (author translation). 
308. Id. 
309. Id. (noting certain officers provide gangs with details about patrols so their friends and 
family can avoid arrest). See also Maras Están Infiltradas en la Policía y el Ejército de El Salvador, 
LA PRENSA (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.laprensa.hn/mundo/911239-410/maras-est%C3%A1n-
infiltradas-en-la-polic%C3%ADa-y-el-ej%C3%A9rcito-de-el-salvador [https://perma.cc/YKC6-
N6BC] (reporting that in 2015, El Salvador’s Secretary of Communications recognized that gangs 
have successfully infiltrated the police and military ranks) (author translation). 
310. See Gangs of El Salvador, supra note 286. 
311. Jessel Santos, 470,264 Personas Afines a Pandillas, LA PRENSA GRAFICA (May 25, 2013, 
6:00 AM), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/470-264-personas-afines-a-pandillas [https://perma.cc/ 
4BSK-L9XU] (author translation). 
312. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014). 
313. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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such as the M-18 gang and the MS-13 gang.
314
 The law’s purpose was to 
encourage witnesses to come forward and report crimes.
315
 
The witness protection program’s inability to offer adequate 
protection remains a point of contention,
316
 especially when one 
considers the vast gang networks at play in the Northern Triangle.
317
 
According to a former prosecutor, gangs murdered at least 100 witnesses 
in 2010, often mutilating bodies in the process.
318
 Moreover, some 
judges continue to deny witnesses anonymity from gang members at 
trial, which limits the overall effectiveness of the witness protection 
program.
319
 In 2011, at least ten witnesses under the program’s 
protection were forced to testify in front of gang members without the 
use of voice distortion devices or masks to hide their identities.
320
 Six 
hours after one of these witnesses testified, his son and niece were killed 
in a home attack.
321
 
                                                     
314. Id. “The law states, in pertinent part: ‘Considering . . . [t]hat the current Salvadoran reality 
evidences the necessity that victims, witnesses and others who are involved in . . . judicial 
proceedings, as well as their families . . . should be protected to avoid violations of their 
rights. . . .’” Id. at n.15 (citing Decreto No. 1029, Ley Especial Para La Protección De Víctimas Y 
Testigos [Special Law for Victim and Witness Protection], May 25, 2006, 1, 603 (El Sal.), 
http://www.asamblea.gob.sv/eparlamento/indice-legislativo/buscador-de-documentos-
legislativos/ley-especial-para-la-proteccion-de-victimas-y-testigos). “The decree provides for 
ordinary and extraordinary protection measures, Chapter III, Art. 10 and 11, which include changes 
of identity and residence, even to foreign countries.” Id. 
315. See Decreto No. 1029, Ley Especial Para La Protección De Víctimas Y Testigos [Special 
Law for Victim and Witness Protection], May 25, 2006, 1 (El Sal.) (author translation). 
316. See IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., EL SALVADOR, supra note 86 (noting, for 
example, a police investigator under witness protection was killed by gang members); LAURA 
PEDRAZA FARIÑA ET AL., INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, HARVARD 
LAW SCH., NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 88, 
160–61 (2010), http://helenlawrencelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/No-Place-to-HideJan_ 
2010-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL2M-YDLN]; Thomas Boerman, Youth Gangs in El Salvador: 
Unpacking the State Department 2007 Issue Paper, IMMIGRATION DAILY, 
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2010,1117-boerman.shtm [https://perma.cc/HY57-GZSN] (last visited 
July 31, 2016) (explaining that gangs may target individuals from a particular church); Solano, 
supra note 292; Kinosian & Albaladejo, supra note 279 (noting that according to a human rights 
group investigating extrajudicial killings, “‘witness protection practically does not exist. There is 
little attention to victims, and no one wants to come forward to speak.’”). 
317. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 81. 
318. Jaime Ulises Marinero, Asesinados por el “Pecado” de Haber Sido Testigos (y III Entrega), 
LA PÁGINA (Feb. 9, 2011, 7:53 AM), http://www.lapagina.com.sv/ampliar.php?id=46899 
[https://perma.cc/2FHZ-AGGN] (author translation). 
319. See IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., supra note 86, ¶ 3.2. 
320. Jessica Ávalos, FGR Denuncia Desprotección De Testigos, LA PRENSA GRAFICA (Dec. 12, 
2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.laprensagrafica.com/el-salvador/judicial/236615-fgr-denuncia-
desproteccion-de-testigos.html [https://perma.cc/5VM5-W3WM]. 
321. Id. 
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The specific language of El Salvador’s witness protection law does 
not limit protection to witnesses that testify at trial.
322
 The protection is 
available to witnesses “involved in [any] judicial proceeding,”
323
 which 
suggests that people who report crimes to law enforcement qualify for 
the program. Individuals in Jaime’s situation are faced with a decision 
between trusting the witness protection program, or choosing to ignore 
crimes they witness. To make matters even worse, El Salvador’s gangs 
treat “snitches” and potential “snitches” the same: they kill them.
324
 
2. Going One Step Further: The Case for Expanding Asylum 
Eligibility to Witnesses Who Do Not Report Serious Gang Crimes 
to Law Enforcement 
This Comment urges courts to recognize the PSG consisting of 
witnesses who report serious gang crimes to law enforcement. However, 
recognizing this PSG should not preclude courts from recognizing a 
PSG consisting of witnesses to serious gang crimes who do not report 
those crimes to law enforcement.
325
 In fact, the same evidence that 
supports expanding asylum eligibility to include people like Jaime also 
supports expanding eligibility to include certain witnesses who do not 
report serious gang crimes.
326
 While the danger for reporting gang 
crimes is certainly higher than the danger for not reporting those same 
crimes, Salvadoran society recognizes the inherent risk of being a 




Assume that Jaime never provided police with detailed physical 
descriptions of the gang members who killed his father because the M-
18 discovered Jaime’s identity before he had an opportunity to report the 
crime. Evidence suggests that Salvadoran society still accepts Jaime’s 
                                                     
322. See Decreto No. 1029, Ley Especial Para La Protección De Víctimas Y Testigos [Special 
Law for Victim and Witness Protection], May 25, 2006, 1 (El Sal.) (author translation). 
323. Id. 
324. Jorge Beltrán Luna, Aumento de Homicidios por Sospechas de que Son Informantes de la 
Policía, ELSALVADOR.COM (May 20, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/ 
aumento-homicidios-por-sospechas-que-son-informantes-policia-75396 [https://perma.cc/F8MP-
AHSJ] (author translation). 
325. If the M-18 erroneously believes Jaime reported the crime to police, Jaime has an imputed 
characteristic and therefore meets the four factors needed to establish a well-founded fear. See supra 
note 63. 
326. For instance, El Salvador’s ineffective witness protection program and the overwhelming 
evidence of police corruption deters witnesses from reporting gang crimes to law enforcement. See 
supra Part III.A.1. 
327. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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membership in a “socially distinct” group despite the fact he did not 
report the crime.
328
 Salvadoran society recognizes that gangs routinely 
murder people for simply witnessing crimes—even if the witness does 
not intend to report the crime to law enforcement.
329
 In March 2016, the 
MS-13 murdered two healthcare workers in their home because the gang 
suspected the couple witnessed a homicide and reported it to police.
330
 
This example shows how gangs are now targeting and killing people 
they suspect of being witnesses or informants.
331
 In specific instances, 
being considered a “snitch” is no less dangerous than being the actual 
“snitch” who reports the gang crime directly to law enforcement.
332
 
Witnessing a gang crime is reason enough to trigger a deadly response 
from gangs.
333
 Requiring witnesses to report serious gang crimes to 
police is the same as effectively requiring witnesses to announce their 
identities and home addresses to gangs.
334
 
                                                     
328. Id. 
329. See Ángela Castro, Matan a Dueño de Pupusería en Mejicanos, ELSALVADOR.COM (July 13, 
2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/matan-dueno-pupuseria-mejicanos-
64312 [https://perma.cc/F9E3-96HS] (reporting police suspected a pupusería owner was murdered 
because he may have witnessed a homicide that took place in the area) (author translation); Sarah 
Kinosian et al., El Salvador’s Gang Violence: Turf Wars, Internal Battles, and Life Defined by 
Invisible Borders, LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP: JUST AM.: A BLOG BY LAWG (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69-general/1579-el-salvadors-gang-violence-turf-wars-
internal-battles-and-life-defined-by-invisible-borders [https://perma.cc/WE8C-2CA2]; Matan a 
Cuatro Jóvenes en San Juan del Gozo, ELSALVADOR.COM (Aug. 23, 2015, 6:58 PM), 
http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/matan-cuatro-jovenes-san-juan-del-gozo-85361 
[https://perma.cc/Q8ST-QVS3] (reporting a former gang member was hunted down and murdered 
in August 2015 after he joined a religious youth group and three additional youths were killed 
because the gang did not want to leave any witnesses) (author translation); Matan a Dos Personas 
en Rosario de Mora, ELSALVADOR.COM (Sept. 27, 2015, 1:41 PM), 
http://www.elsalvador.com/articulo/sucesos/matan-dos-personas-rosario-mora-88544 
[https://perma.cc/6UYM-HEWF] (reporting that in 2015 an old man was murdered because he 
walked past a group of gang members while they executed another man) (author translation).  
330. See Repunte de Homicidios en el Área de la Matanza, supra note 278 (reporting couple was 
surrounded by their grandchildren when they were shot to death) (author translation). 
331. See Luna, supra note 278 (reporting various instances in which Salvadorans were murdered 
because gangs suspected they were police informants, including a man from Usulután who was shot 




334. Jaime will have difficulty establishing a nexus between the persecution and the protected 
interest if he refused to report the gang crime because he feared the police were corrupted by the M-
18. Specifically, critics will argue that Jaime is not being targeted for possessing a trait, but rather 
because the M-18 is trying to expand its criminal activities. Adequately evaluating the merits of this 
proposed PSG likely requires a separate analysis that goes beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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As Judge Posner noted in Gatimi, members of a group that are being 
persecuted will go to great lengths to conceal their identities.
335
 This is 
especially true in a place like El Salvador, where gangs operate with 
impunity. Even some police officers fear gang reprisal for simply 
mentioning how and why a crime took place.
336
 Witnesses to gang 
crimes have an obvious explanation for attempting to conceal their 
identities—gangs kill snitches. The dangers associated with reporting 
gang crimes to law enforcement outweigh the risks of witnessing a gang 
crime and not reporting it. However, both groups are presumed to be 
snitches and treated alike. In El Salvador, gangs have sent a very clear 




The 1967 Protocol imposes a duty on the United States to protect 
refugees like Jaime from their persecutors. If the United States refuses to 
honor this duty, it not only forecloses the opportunity for Jaime to gain 
asylum, but it also forces Jaime to return to El Salvador where he faces 
almost certain death. The United States is aware that Jaime cannot safely 
return to El Salvador. Fortunately, American courts are capable of 
expanding asylum eligibility by recognizing new PSGs under the BIA’s 
updated three-prong test. Because Jaime’s group passes this test, he is a 
member of a PSG. Therefore, he and every other member of his group 
should be afforded the same opportunity to win asylum that the Ninth 
Circuit gave to Henriquez-Rivas. 
                                                     
335. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). 
336. See Castro, supra note 329 (author translation). 
337. Una Clic Controla el Barrio San Jacinto, supra note 279 (author translation); see also Luna 
supra, note 278 (author translation). 
